

19 August 1975

DRAFT

KEP on FY 1975 KIQ #4

KIQ #4: What are the capabilities, intentions, and expectations of the two sides in the Sino-Soviet relationship -- confrontation, reconciliation, or continued uneasy stalemate?

PART I -- EVALUATION OF KIQ ACHIEVEMENT

A. Overall Performance Evaluation.

2. KIQ #4 on Sino-Soviet relations was substantially satisfied in FY 1975. The year saw few important events or new trends in Sino-Soviet relations per se, (although current internal Chinese developments and the US withdrawal from mainland Southeast Asia will both have future impact on the relationship.) More collection and analytical work was therefore, properly, devoted to the two sides' perceptions of each other and their future expectations of the relationship, than to analysis or prediction of specific events. There were no significant changes in the Sino-Soviet military balance; the community satisfactorily followed the routine upgrading of the forces of both sides.

NSA review(s) completed.

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B. Evaluation of Performance with respect to  
Collection Objectives and Relative Contribution of  
Collection Methods.

Collection objectives on this KIQ were substantially met, for the time period involved and in relation to advance commitments and expectations. While technical sources -- principally overhead photography [redacted] -- cover the Sino-Soviet military balance adequately, political relationships and expectations of the two sides involve a semi-blind connecting of data that are never even adequate for either side alone. In FY 1975, regarding Soviet perceptions of China [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] Our satisfaction is relative only to the difficulty of collection on this problem, however, not to the importance of the subject or absolute standards of collection fulfillment.

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C. Evaluation of Performance with Respect to  
Production Objectives.

All agencies' current intelligence production on the Sino-Soviet problem was reasonably comprehensive.

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[redacted] made major contributions to longer range understanding of several facets of the relationship, not only with the "Soviet Policy and the Changing Moscow-Peking-Washington Triangle," (December 1974), but also:

"How Hanoi, Peking and Moscow View the New Situation in Southeast Asia," July 1975

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[redacted]  
"The Chinese Assessment of the Soviet Military Threat," April 1975

The Bayesian analysis of the likelihood of hostilities and level of tension, conducted every month to six weeks by OPR, served as a useful ongoing check against the possibility of an otherwise unnoticed change in the situation.

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[redacted] met its KIQ Strategy Report commitments, excepting a (reasonable) delay until Fall 1975 in a study of China's mobilization potential.

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PART II -- EVALUATION OF AGENCY COMMITMENTS

A. Collections Programs.

See I. B. above; nothing to add.

B. Production Programs.

See I. C. above; nothing to add.

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SECTION A: KIQ PERFORMANCE REPORT

ANNEX A. KIQ DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT TABLE

KIQ NO.: 4 KIQ: What are the capabilities, intentions, and expectations of the two sides in the Sino-Soviet relationship--confrontation, reconciliation, or continued uneasy stalemate?

Preparing NIO:

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	Complete	Almost Complete	Substantial	Partial	Largely Unsatisfied	Almost Totally Unsatisfied	Totally Unsatisfied
KIQ, as a whole			X				
Objectives							
<u>Collection</u>							
Objective #1							
Objective #2							
Objective #3							
Objective #4							
<u>Production</u>							
Objective #1							
Objective #2							
Objective #3							

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